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Abstract 
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, a number of foreign 
governments enacted stabilization measures to protect their domestic economies in the 
wake of the global credit crunch. The Bank Recapitalization Fund (the Fund), announced by 
the South Korean government on December 18, 2008, and implemented on February 15, 
2009, was one such intervention intended to assist Korean commercial banks in 
strengthening their capital bases and thus restore normal lending practices between banks 
and nonfinancial institutions. Invoking its authority under Article 65, Section 3 
(“Emergency Credit to Financial Institutions”), of Chapter IV of the Bank of Korea Act, the 
government committed up to KRW 20.0 trillion for the purchase of preferred shares, 
hybrid securities, or subordinated debt from participating banks. Each bank wishing to 
utilize the fund was required to sign with the Korean government a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) stating its commitment to using the funds gained from the sales to 
support the real economy. Continued individual usage, interest rates, and restrictions were 
determined based on the institution’s adherence to the MoU terms. On March 31, 2009, the 
Fund purchased approximately KRW 4.0 trillion in hybrid securities and subordinated debt 
from eight Korean banks and financial institutions. By December 2011, the government had 
recovered KRW 2.8 trillion through bond sales and bank buyback arrangements. The 
remaining KRW 1.2 trillion was repaid to the government by August 2016, at which point 
the Fund ceased operations. 
Keywords: capital injection, capital adequacy ratio, Financial Services, Commission, Global 
Financial Crisis, South Korea 
  
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the Global Financial Crisis that pertain to broad-based capital injection 
programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at  
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/. 





At a Glance 
In the wake of Lehman Brothers’ collapse 
on September 15, 2008, governments 
around the world enacted stabilization 
measures to protect their domestic 
economies from the massive disruption in 
global credit markets. Among them, the 
Republic of Korea sought to implement a 
series of short-term interventions that 
would both boost liquidity and restore 
healthy lending between banks and 
nonfinancial institutions, particularly small 
and midsize enterprises (SMEs). One such 
program was the Bank Recapitalization 
Fund (the Fund), announced on December 
18, 2008, and implemented on February 15, 
2009, as part of the Financial Services 
Commission (FSC) plan of action in 
response to the Global Financial Crisis. 
Invoking its authority under Article 65, 
Section 3 (“Emergency Credit to Financial 
Institutions”), of Chapter IV of the Bank of 
Korea Act, the Korean government 
committed up to KRW 20.0 trillion3 for the 
purchase of preferred shares, hybrid 
securities, or subordinated debt from 
Korean commercial banks. The funds were 
to be raised from a combination of both 
private and public sources—KRW 
10.0 trillion from the Bank of Korea, KRW 
2.0 trillion from Korea Development Bank, and KRW 8.0 trillion from institutional and 
private investors.  
Korean commercial banks wishing to participate in the Fund were required to sign with the 
Korean government a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) stating their commitment to 
assisting the real economy. Progress—or lack thereof—toward these objectives 
determined individual usage caps, interest rates, and other restrictions. After having 
 
3 KRW 1.0 = 0.00097 USD. 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To strengthen the capital base of banks in 
order to encourage lending to nonfinancial 
institutions, particularly SMEs, through the purchase 
of preferred shares, hybrid securities, or 




December 18, 2008/ 
February 15, 2009 
Expiration Date  August 2016 
Usage KRW 4.0 trillion by eight 
private banks and financial 
institutions  
Participants Woori Financial Holdings, 
Woori Bank, Kookmin Bank, 
Hana Bank, NH Bank, Suhyup 
Bank, Kyongnam Bank, 
Kwangju Bank 
Overseer Financial Services 
Commission, Bank 
Recapitalization Fund 
Oversight Committee  
Legal Authority Article 65, Section 3 
(“Emergency Credit to 
Financial Institutions”), of 
Chapter IV of the Bank of 
Korea Act  
South Korea: Bank Recapitalization Fund 
423
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 3
received approval from the FSC, banks could then access the Fund on a capital call basis 
when in need of liquidity.  
On March 31, 2009, the Fund initiated its first round of bond purchases—KRW 3.5 trillion 
in hybrid securities with 30-year maturities and KRW 500 billion in subordinated debt 
with maturities of five years and nine months—from eight banks and financial institutions. 
By the end of November 2011, a total of KRW 1.3 trillion had been repaid through the 
combined sale of KRW 503.0 billion in subordinated securities on the open market and 
KRW 800.0 billion in hybrid security buybacks by the issuing banks. On December 9, 2011, 
the government initiated an early repayment scheme whereby banks were allowed to buy 
back their hybrid securities before maturity. A total of KRW 1.5 trillion was recovered 
through this process, and the remaining KRW 1.2 trillion was repaid to the government by 
August 2016.  
Summary Evaluation 
The Korean government viewed the early repayment scheme as an indication of the Fund’s 
success in helping banks to recover from the negative impact of the Global Financial Crisis. 
However, a report by the National Assembly Budget Office noted that the FSC may not have 
done enough to establish the program in a timely manner, as many of the stronger banks 
had already raised their Tier 1 capital ratios by the time the Fund became operational.  
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South Korean Context 2007–2008 
GDP 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU  
converted to USD) 
$1.2 trillion in 2007 
$1.1 trillion in 2008 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU  
converted to USD) 
$24,086 in 2007 
$21,350 in 2008 
Sovereign credit rating  
(five-year senior debt) 








Size of banking system $1.1 trillion in total assets in 2007 $1.0 trillion in total assets 2008 
Size of banking system  
as a percentage of GDP 
89.9% in 2007 
96.8% in 2008 
Size of banking system  
as a percentage of financial system 
Data not available for 2007 
Data not available for 2008 
Foreign involvement in banking system Data not available for 2007 77% of total banking assets in 2008 
Government ownership of  
banking system 
Data not available for 2007 
22% of banks owned by the state in 
2008 
Existence of deposit insurance 
100% insurance on deposits up to 
$41,960 for 2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to 
$41,960 for 2008 
Sources: Bloomberg, Cull, Martinez Peria, and Verrier 2018, World Bank Global 
Financial Development Database, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, 
and World Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset. 
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I. Overview 
Background 
Due to its success in overcoming the market volatility caused by the Asian Financial Crisis 
of 1997, the Republic of Korea was thought to have been relatively more prepared than its 
Western counterparts to manage the economic fallout from the Global Financial Crisis (Lee 
and Rhee 2012). Despite having strengthened its regulatory institutions and policies, 
however, Korea was greatly impacted by the subprime mortgage downturn in 2007. This 
was partially due to the fact that during the first half of 2008, overseas lenders collectively 
withdrew $886 million, and net foreign direct investment turned negative for the first time 
since 1980 (Fackler 2008). Such a large divestment would later exacerbate Korea’s inability 
to repay its external debts and, consequently, the relatively stable economy remained 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks (Harden 2008).  
The summer of 2008 brought with it a precipitous decline in confidence as the stock 
market dropped 38% and the Korean won fell 30% against the dollar. In alarmed response, 
both banks and major corporations, such as Hyundai and Samsung, began hoarding 
domestic currency (Harden 2008; Sang-Hun 2008). The failure of Lehman Brothers on 
September 15 aggravated matters considerably, sending global credit markets into chaos 
and driving further anxieties over the strength of Korea’s export markets and foreign 
currency reserves. As the state of the broader economy worsened, individual domestic 
banks began to experience the effects of the crisis more directly. Woori Bank, one of 
Korea’s largest lenders, faced a serious liquidity shortage when overseas banks began to 
refuse to roll over many existing loans and instead insisted that Woori pay its maturing 
obligations in dollars (Fackler 2008). The government responded by supplying the bank 
with $280 million in dollar loans. 
This lending crisis spread rapidly as investors lost confidence in Korean banks’ abilities to 
honor their maturing foreign currency loans. Following the collapse of Lehman, capital 
outflows totaled $42.8 billion between Q4 2008 and Q1 2009 (Kim 2009). Such a large 
selloff, coupled with the depreciation of the won and rising borrowing costs, caused 
Moody’s to declare Korea to be “one of the few banking systems in Asia where domestic 
deposits are insufficient to fund loans” (Sang-Hun 2008). Furthermore, S&P downgraded 
the Big Four Korean banks—Kookmin Bank, Woori Bank, Shinhan Bank, and Hana Bank—
from “stable” to “negative” on October 1. Their ability to raise foreign capital thus 
continued to decline (Gup 2010).  
Having relatively recently opened its market to the international community, Korea did not 
have access to the same emergency sources of foreign currency reserves as did other 
countries. It was also more susceptible to market instability due to its transparency and 
openness to foreign investment (Fackler 2008). In response to the deleterious effects of the 
Global Financial Crisis, the Korean Financial Services Commission (FSC) sought to calm and 
protect domestic markets by proposing a comprehensive set of stabilization measures to be 
enacted throughout 2009. While other interventions, such as the State Guarantee of 
External Debt of Korean Banks (see Engbith 2020), had been announced previously in 
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October 2008, the government designed a coordinated response to address the ongoing 
market volatility. Aside from the Bank Recapitalization Fund (the Fund), the new plans 
provided for the establishment of the Bond Market Stabilization Fund, the Stock Market 
Stabilization Fund, and the Bank Capital Expansion Fund. The FSC also issued new 
guidelines for the restructuring of distressed companies and tightened supervision of the 
financial derivatives market. 
Program Description 
On December 18, 2008, the FSC released its agenda and recommendations for the 
upcoming 2009 fiscal year. Included in those plans was a provision for the creation of the 
Bank Recapitalization Fund, an intervention designed to assist Korean commercial banks in 
replenishing capital and lending to the domestic economy by raising capital adequacy 
ratios by 1.5%. Officially implemented on February 15, 2009, and jointly administered by 
the FSC and the Bank Recapitalization Fund Oversight Committee, the Fund was founded 
under the legal authority granted by Article 65, Section 3 (“Emergency Credit to Financial 
Institutions”), of Chapter IV of the Bank of Korea Act. Importantly, its establishment 
allowed the government to strengthen the capital base of all banks—even those meeting 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) capital requirements of 9%—to encourage 
lending to nonfinancial institutions, particularly small and midsize enterprises (SMEs), 
through the purchase and resale of preferred shares, hybrid securities, or subordinated 
debt from Korean commercial banks. 
The Korean government committed up to a total of KRW 20.0 trillion4 (2% of GDP) for 
Fund purchases. The Bank of Korea (BOK) first utilized the Korea Development Bank (KDB) 
as a conduit to channel KRW 10.0 trillion in loans to the Fund. This was due to the fact that 
Article 80 of the Bank of Korea Act limited loans to profit-making enterprises (i.e., 
nonfinancial institutions like the Fund) only when “there [was] a severe deflation of 
monetary credit.” Because that was not the case at the time, the BOK lent to the KDB (a 
financial institution) under Article 65, Section 3 (“Emergency Credit to Financial 
Institutions”), of Chapter IV of the Bank of Korea Act.5 In addition to acting as a 
passthrough for the central bank loans, the KDB lent KRW 2.0 trillion to the Fund, bringing 
the total to KRW 12.0 trillion. The government intended to raise the final KRW 8 trillion by 
purchasing banks’ subordinated debt and hybrid securities through the Fund and selling 
them to institutional investors in the form of securitized bonds 
Of the KRW 20.0 trillion allocated, the Fund used KRW 10.0 trillion for the purchase of 
preferred shares (KRW 2.0 trillion) and hybrid securities (KRW 8.0 trillion); it utilized the 
other KRW 10 trillion to acquire subordinated debt (FSC 2009a). See Figure 1 below: 
  
 
4  KRW 1.0 = 0.00097 USD (World Bank). 
5 Article 80 has since been amended to allow the Bank of Korea to lend to private entities “when severe 
impediments to obtaining funds from financial institutions occur or when there is a strong likelihood of their 
occurrence such as periods of severe monetary and credit contraction” (Bank of Korea Act, no. 14242).  
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Source: FSC 2009a, translated from the original Korean. 
Participation in the Fund was open to all Korean commercial banks and financial 
institutions, both regional and national. Preferred shares, hybrid securities, and 
subordinated debt were eligible for issuance to the Fund by participating banks. In order to 
reduce stigma, individual caps on usage were imposed based on a bank’s asset holdings 
rather than credit ratings (Lee and Rhee 2012). Banks were assigned, according to the size 
of their assets, to Group I, II, III, or IV. Within the limits imposed for each group (as shown 
in Figure 5 below), the capital injection amount for each bank was limited to a 1.5% 
increase in its capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and varied according to its lending to small and 
medium-size businesses. The Fund determined the CAR limits based on a desire to avoid 
any imbalance in or concentration of capital support for selected banks (FSC 2009a). 
To apply for access to the Fund, a bank was required to sign with the Bank Recapitalization 
Fund Oversight Committee an implementation Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
specifying particular commitments to providing liquidity support to the real economy, 
SMEs, and corporate restructuring programs. The FSC then continually monitored each 
institution’s progress with respect to the MoU obligations and adjust any government 
support accordingly. For instance, a bank that did not demonstrate clear progress toward 
supporting the real economy could face limited access to the Fund and higher applicable 
interest rates in subsequent rounds of bond purchases.  
Although participating banks were required to support the real economy and commit to 
corporate restructuring, the FSC was not to intervene in bank management. This 
stipulation was intended to encourage banks to continue to lend and to take on 
restructuring themselves. Specific usage of capital injected was tailored to each bank, and 
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the banks submitted a monthly report on compliance with specific conditions attached to 
the capital injection (FSC 2009a). 
The Fund was managed by a committee consisting of nine members chosen from the FSC, 
participating banks, and institutional investors. The chair of the committee was an 
academic.  
The diverse composition of the committee was intended to reflect different interests in a 
balanced way and to ensure transparency in the management of the Fund (FSC 2009a). The 
committee decided on applicable interest rates and other conditions of the program. It was 
also responsible for reviewing mandatory reports submitted by the banks regarding their 
usage of the injected capital. 
Outcomes 
The Fund provided capital in the form of preferred shares, hybrid securities, and 
subordinated debt. The FSC decided what capital to inject after a review of each bank. 
While preferred shares and hybrid securities were considered Tier 1, subordinated debt 
was categorized as Tier 2. Hybrid securities were to have a maturity of 30 years or longer, 
with a call option after five years from issuance; it was also subordinated to the Tier 2 
capital. Subordinated debt had a maturity of five years or longer (FSC 2009a). 
Prior to the first round of bond purchases, the FSC undertook a review of all Korean 
commercial banks to assess their compliance with the MoU terms. Six banks received 
“excellent” ratings, while the remaining eight were rated as “satisfactory” (see Figure 2).  
An interest rate of 6.59% was imposed on nationwide banks with an “excellent” rating 
issuing hybrid securities, while those deemed to be “satisfactory” incurred an additional 30 
basis points (6.89%). Similarly, nationwide banks with ratings of “excellent” issuing 
subordinated debt were charged an interest rate of 6.49%, while “satisfactory” banks were 
charged at a rate of 6.59%. To account for the discrepancy between regional and 
nationwide banks’ credit ratings, regional banks were charged an additional 30 basis points 
on top of their larger counterparts’ rates (FSC 2009b). 











Hybrid securities  6.59% 6.89% 6.89% 7.19% 













Source: FSC 2011. 
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On March 31, 2009, the Fund purchased from eight Korean banks and financial institutions 
KRW 3.5 trillion in hybrid securities with maturities of 30 years and KRW 500 billion in 
subordinated debt with maturities of five years and nine months. This was the sole round 
of purchases conducted by the Fund. The table in Figure 3 details the issuances by bank:  





















— 1,000 1,000 400 750 100 116 87 3,453 
Subordinated 
debt 
300 — — — — — 116 87 503 
















Note: Amounts denominated in KRW, billions. 
Source: FSC 2011. 
By the end of November 2011, a total of KRW 1.3 trillion had been repaid through the 
combined sale of KRW 503.0 billion6 in subordinated securities on the open market and 
KRW 800 billion7 in hybrid security buybacks by issuing banks (FSC 2011).  
On December 9, 2011, the Bank Recapitalization Fund Oversight Committee approved the 
implementation of an additional early repayment scheme whereby issuers were able to buy 
back their hybrid securities before maturity (see Figure 4 below). This arrangement 
allowed four banks,8 whose earnings had increased over the course of 2011, to purchase a 
total of KRW 1.5 trillion in hybrid securities (FSC 2011). The outstanding amount to be 
recovered was thus lowered to KRW 1.2 trillion, or 29% of the Fund’s total utilization.  
According to an internal Bank of Korea report, the remaining KRW 1.2 trillion in hybrid 
securities was repaid in full by August 2016, at which point the government closed the 
Bank Recapitalization Fund. 
  
 
6 Kyongnam and Kwangju banks (KRW 203 billion, March 2010), and Woori Financial Holdings (KRW 300 
billion, December 2010). 
7 Hana (KRW 100 billion, March 2011), Kookmin (KRW 400 billion, April 2011), and Woori Bank (KRW 300 
billion, May 2011). 
8 Kookmin (KRW 600 billion), Hana (KRW 300 billion), Woori Bank (KRW 200 billion), and NH Bank (KRW 
400 billion). 
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Woori Bank 1,000 300 200 500 
Kookmin 1,000 400 600 — 
Hana 400 100 300 — 
NH 750 — 400 350 
Suhyup 100 — — 100 
Kyongnam 116 — — 116 
Kwangju 87 — — 87 



















Note: Amounts denominated in KRW, billions. 
Source: FSC 2011. 
Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: The Fund was announced by the Korean government as one of 
a series of short-term stabilization measures announced on December 18, 2008, 
in response to the Global Financial Crisis.  
On December 18, 2008, the Financial Services Commission announced a package of short-
term stabilization measures to be implemented throughout 2009. Among other 
interventions intended to boost liquidity within the Korean economy, the FSC plans 
provided support for the domestic financial markets through the establishment of the Bond 
Market Stabilization Fund and the Stock Market Stabilization Fund, bolstered the 
soundness of capital reserves through the Bank Capital Expansion Fund, and increased 
consumer confidence with a series of amendments to existing debt repayment laws. 
Furthermore, the FSC laid out plans to oversee the restructuring of distressed companies 
and tighten supervision of the financial derivatives market. 
2. Legal Authority: The Korean government created the Fund under the authority 
granted by Article 65, Section 3 (“Emergency Credit to Financial Institutions”), of 
Chapter IV of the Bank of Korea Act. 
Article 65, Section 3 (“Emergency Credit to Financial Institutions”), of Chapter IV of the 
Bank of Korea Act stipulates the following: 
The Bank of Korea may, in any of the following subparagraphs, extend credits to any 
financial institution secured on assets whose properness has been temporarily granted 
with the consent of not less than four members: 
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(1) Where it extends credits temporarily to any financial institution in a vital 
emergency in which the stabilization of currency and banking business are directly 
threatened. 
3. Governance/Administration: The Fund was managed by a committee consisting 
of nine members chosen from the FSC, participating banks, and institutional 
investors. The chair of the committee was an academic.  
The diverse composition of the committee was intended to reflect different interests in a 
balanced way and to ensure transparency in the management of the Fund (FSC 2009a). The 
committee decided on applicable interest rates and other conditions of the program. It was 
also responsible for reviewing mandatory reports submitted by the banks regarding their 
usage of the injected capital. 
4. Size: Drawing upon public and private sources of funding, the Korean 
government committed a total of KRW 20.0 trillion for Fund purchases.  
The Bank of Korea utilized the Korea Development Bank as a conduit to channel KRW 10.0 
trillion in loans to the Fund. This was due to the fact that Article 80 of the Bank of Korea Act 
limited loans to profit-making enterprises (i.e., nonfinancial institutions like the Fund) only 
when “there [was] a severe deflation of monetary credit.” Because that was not the case, 
the BOK lent to the KDB (a financial institution) under Article 65 of the Bank of Korea Act. 
The KDB lent an additional KRW 2.0 trillion, bringing the total to KRW 12.0 trillion. 
The government intended to raise the final KRW 8.0 trillion by purchasing banks’ 
subordinated and hybrid securities through the Fund and selling them to institutional 
investors in the form of securitized bonds.  
Of the KRW 20.0 trillion allocated, the Fund used KRW 10.0 trillion for the purchase of 
preferred shares (KRW 2.0 trillion) and hybrid securities (KRW 8.0 trillion); it utilized the 
other KRW 10.0 trillion to acquire subordinated debt (FSC 2009a).  
5. Source of Injections: The Fund provided capital in the form of preferred shares, 
hybrid securities, and subordinated debt. 
The FSC decided what capital to inject after a review of each bank. While preferred shares 
and hybrid securities were considered Tier 1, subordinated debt was categorized as Tier 2. 
Hybrid securities were to have a maturity of 30 years or longer, with a call option after five 
years from issuance; it was also subordinated to the Tier 2 capital. Subordinated debt was 
to have a maturity of five years or longer (FSC 2009a). 
On March 31, 2009, the Fund purchased from eight Korean banks and financial institutions  
KRW 3.5 trillion in hybrid securities with maturities of 30 years and KRW 500 billion in 
subordinated debt with maturities of five years and nine months. This was the sole round 
of purchases conducted by the Fund. The table in Figure 3 details the issuances by bank. 
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6. Eligible Institutions: All Korean commercial banks, both regional and national, 
were eligible for Fund use.  
In designing the program, the Korean government aimed to increase BIS ratios among 
Korean banks by 1.5%. However, it was not a requirement for participation that banks’ 
capital adequacy ratios fall below a certain threshold; on the contrary, the Fund allowed 
the government to inject capital into banks with ratios above the BIS requirement of 9%, 
which had previously not been legally feasible. It was thus hoped that providing stronger 
capital bases for commercial banks would encourage increased lending to the real 
economy.  
Banks could voluntarily access the Fund when in need of capital. 
7. Individual Participation Limits: Caps on individual banks’ participation were 
imposed according to each bank’s asset holdings. 
Banks were assigned, according to the size of their assets, to Group I, II, III, or IV. Within the 
limits imposed for each group (as shown in Figure 5 below), the capital injection amount 
for each bank was limited to a 1.5% increase in its capital adequacy ratio and varied 
according to its lending to small and medium-size businesses. The Fund determined the 
CAR limits based on a desire to avoid any imbalance in or concentration of capital support 
for selected banks (FSC 2009a). 
Figure 5: Groups for Individual Capital Injection Amount 
Group 
Group I  
(assets of more 
than KRW 200 
trillion) 
Group II  
(assets of KRW 
140 trillion–200 
trillion) 
Group III  
(assets of KRW 
50 trillion–140 
trillion) 
Group IV  
(assets of less 





Max KRW 2 trillion 
Max KRW 
1.5 trillion 
Max KRW 1 trillion 
Max KRW 
300 billion 






Bank of Korea 
Korea Exchange 
Bank, Citi, SC Cheil 
Suhyup and other 
regional banks 
 
Source: FSC 2009a 
8. Pricing Terms: A bank’s access to the Fund was contingent upon how well the 
bank provided liquidity support to the real economy, SMEs, and corporate 
restructuring programs.  
Initial interest rates for participation were dictated by the scoring grid described in Figure 
2 above. Upon applying for access to the program, each bank was required to sign with the 
Korean government an MoU stating its continued commitment to assisting the real 
economy. The FSC then conducted monthly progress assessments and adjusted accordingly 
the terms of Fund utilization, interest rates, and other usage restrictions. These reviews 
took place throughout November and December 2008 (FSC 2009a). 
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FSC’s review of the commercial banks’ compliance with the MoU terms resulted in six 
banks receiving “excellent” ratings, while the remaining eight received “satisfactory” 
ratings. An interest rate of 6.59% was imposed on nationwide banks with an “excellent” 
rating issuing hybrid securities, while those deemed to be “satisfactory” incurred an 
additional 30 basis points (6.89%). Similarly, nationwide banks with ratings of “excellent” 
issuing subordinated debt were charged an interest rate of 6.49%, while “satisfactory” 
banks were charged at a rate of 6.59%. To account for the discrepancy between regional 
and nationwide banks’ credit ratings, regional banks were charged an additional 30 basis 
points on top of their larger counterparts’ rates (FSC 2009b). 
9. Debt Restructuring: Although participating banks were required to support the 
real economy and commit to corporate restructuring, the FSC was not to 
intervene in bank management. 
This stipulation was intended to encourage banks to continue to lend and to take on 
restructuring themselves. Specific usage of capital injected was tailored to each bank, and 
the banks submitted a monthly report on compliance with specific conditions agreed upon 
in their individual MoUs (FSC 2009a).  
10. Exit Strategy: Initially, no end date was set for the Fund’s operation.  
According to the Fund’s internal operating rules, its activities were to be terminated upon 
full repayment.  
On December 9, 2011, the Bank Recapitalization Fund Oversight Committee approved the 
implementation of an additional early repayment scheme whereby issuers were able to buy 
back their hybrid securities before maturity. This arrangement allowed four banks,9 whose 
earnings had increased over the course of 2011, to purchase a total of KRW 1.5 trillion in 
hybrid securities (FSC 2011). The outstanding amount to be recovered was thus lowered to 
KRW 1.2 trillion, or 29% of the Fund’s total utilization.  
The remaining KRW 1.2 trillion in hybrid securities was repaid in full by August 2016, at 
which point the Bank Recapitalization Fund ceased operations. 
Evaluation 
The Korean government viewed the implementation of the early repayment scheme as an 
indication that “banks [had] successfully recovered from the 2008 global financial crisis” 
(FSC 2011). Lee and Rhee (2012) have also characterized the Fund as a general success, 
providing “a safeguard to banks against possible substantial losses” without imposing any 
“fiscal burden.” 
 
9 Kookmin (KRW 600 billion), Hana (KRW 300 billion), Woori Bank (KRW 200 billion), and NH Bank (KRW 
400 billion). 
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However, a report published in July 2009 by the National Assembly Budget Office (NABO) 
noted that the government may not have done enough to establish the program in a timely 
manner; most banks had already raised their Tier 1 capital ratios in 2008, and those that 
had not were likely to face scrutiny for contributing to the Fund. Furthermore, concerns 
about government interference in bank management may have caused larger institutions, 
such as Citigroup and SC Cheil Bank, to decline participation (NABO 2009). A press release 
published by the FSC in February 2009, by contrast, had assured potential participants that 
the government would not intervene in the banks’ normal operations (FSC 2009a). 
Additionally, a press release published by the FSC in July 2009 asserted that although 
banks may not have used the Fund to its maximum potential, the Fund acted as an excellent 
backup that shored up confidence in the banking system, allowing banks to increase capital 
from the market, and minimized cost to public funds (FSC 2009d).  
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